Benutzer:Nils Simon/Studien/2006-Wendt

This essay is part of my "International Theory" class which I'm taking during my 2006-2007 MA International Relations course in Brighton, UK.

What are the implications of Wendt's claim that anarchy is simply a construct?

Introduction

In the 1980s, a new school of thought appeared on the theoretical stage of International Relations scholarship. At that time, there were mainly two debates occurring among IR theorists (Reus-Smit 2005, pp. 188). One was between structural or neo-realists on the one side and institutionalists or neo-liberals on the other side. Both of these approaches rested on basically micro-economic assumptions about rational behaviour of the main actors, which are states, and the general perception that these states approach each other in an anarchical environment. The most important problems these two schools of thought were seeking to solve were the degree to which cooperation between states is possible, that is the extent to which institutions can help overcoming violent conflict, and whether cooperation needs to guarantee a state relative gains against competitors, or if it is enough to get absolute gains. Due to their sharing of main assumptions, this debate became later called the “neo-neo debate” (Lamy 2005, p. 215).

The other debate occurred “between rationalists and critical theorists” (Reus-Smit 2005, p. 188), with the latter accusing the former to be unconscious of some severe problems their approaches imply. Among these problems is the hidden conservatism of rationalist approaches that makes them describe only how things are, but not how they became the things the are, or how they could be alternatively in another environment. Critical theory, according to Cox (1981, p. 89), “does not take institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how an whether they might be in the process of changing.” To Cox, the awareness of its own creation and thus its self-reflexivity is what distinguishes critical theory from the so-called “problem-solving theories”, which are stuck to the present configuration of their investigated objects and do not allow for asking questions about their own creation as a theory.

Out of critical theory, and out of sociological theory as well, critics of the 'neo-neos' argued “for greater attention to ideational forces such as ideas, knowledge, norms, and rules in order to deepen our interpretation of the origin of states' interests, and the organization of world politics.” (Barnett 2005, p. 252) One of the resulting approaches that does pay greater attention to these elements is the theory of constructivism, becoming prominent after the end of the cold war (Reus-Smit 2005, p. 194).

In this essay, I will not go deeper into how closely (or not) constructivism and critical theory are related today,1 but rather lay down how constructivism in its early stages challenged rationalist approaches, in particular by claiming that anarchy is not an unchangeable structure of the international sphere, but rather an institution constructed through process by states themselves. My primary source is Wendt (1992)2, whom I will use to present the implications this turn has for IR theory.

The role of anarchy

According to structural or neo-realism, “structure is defined by the ordering principle of the international system, which is anarchy, and the distribution of capabilities across units, which are states.” (Lamy 2005, p. 209) The structure determines a certain behaviour of states. Given that the highest interest of states is their own existence, states seek to secure their survival through various means, the most important being a steady increase of power, and the ability to use this power in terms of self-help. The latter arises out of the lack of a higher authority a threatened state could turn to for help.

A state can never be sure that it is not going to be threatened at some time in the future, and thus it constantly prepares for a possible conflict. Such preparation may be done for defensive purposes, but instantly threatens a state's neighbours, since defensive military power can be used easily for offensive purposes as well. Just out of protective measures arises a constant armament of state actors, a so-called 'security dilemma'. This leads to common insecurity, which states seek to balance by joining changing alliances (Donnelly 2005, pp. 35), a process whose outcome is called the 'balance of power'.

What is most important about this way of theorising the international state-environment is that the underlying structure cannot be changed. All actions states do take place within this framework, and cooperation can only occur under heavy suspicion of it possibly leading to more absolute gains for my trading partner than for me, and thus giving me a negative relative gain, in which case I will not continue the 'trade' (which can be practically everything, from economic trade through disarmament agreements to environmental protection – and of course also collective security arrangements).

The idea of classical realists like Hans J. Morgenthau or Erdward H. Carr, that the wish for power can be located in the nature of human beings, is relocated in this structural realism of Kenneth Waltz towards the nature of states. Even, or better to say especially the most selfless state would face a serious threat of extinction in this anarchical system by predator states. But is this really what derives out of the anarchical structure of the 'international'? Is a system of self-help and power politics necessarily connected with anarchy?

Anarchy is what...

According to Wendt, it is not. Systems of self-help are not unchangeable factors due to the nature of states, but much more they act like institutions these states agreed upon, deliberately or not, to pursue. Consequentially, self-help and power politics are not seen as imperative to the anarchical system, but as constructed by the very states within this system. How does Wendt come to this position, and what does it make out of anarchy?

Wendt argues against the neo-realist claim that only changes in process can occur, but not in structure. To him, “transformations of identitiy and interest through process are transformations in structure.” (p. 393). But how can he research interest-transformation in IR, when there exists no theory about it? To solve this problem, Wendt borrows the theory of constructivism from the social theories and tries to adopt it for use in IR.

According to his new approach, he looks for how do state interests formulate in the first place. Given two atomistic states that contact each other for the first time, what will they do? Will they begin to arm themselves and expect the worst? This seems unlikely, since no state has any experience with other states and can thus hardly assume the other one is hostile.3 The first contact will expectedly take place in a cautious environment, and state A will probably act towards state B in a way it wishes to be approached itself (p. 404). Then, state B will think about what the action of state A meant to it – according to the latter's “physical qualities” (p. 405), and it will contemplate about what this gesture would have been good for if state B would have done it itself. The outcomes of this contact are not obvious, and not, as realists would suggest, much likely hazardous. If both states act in a friendly way, this opens the door towards more friendly contacts in the future – but does of course not close the door to war. On the other side, if mistrust is the outcome, this makes both states much more cautious and alarmed in the future, but does not mean that these states have to mistrust each other for eternity from now on.

What these two states begin to establish by their first contacts is an institution, a set of rules on how to approach each other and how to behave during these approaches. What derives out of this is a certain meaning the other has for oneself. And this is exactly how constructivist social theory explains why we do not always end up in constant battle each against each. We act towards other people due to their meaning they have for us. And if experience told us not to expect the worst from one's neighbours, but that they are basically nice, one will hardly stay sleepless every night because of the fear the others will come to rob one. (At least, that would be assumed a behaviour that needs proper psychological treatment.)

The same, so Wendt, is true for states. If we have a system of self-help and power politics, as realist theories suggest, this is not due to an inherent nature of states and the structure of anarchy. It is because states' experience told them to act like that, because in the past they constantly chose to go this way. A self-help system is a self-chosen system. “If states find themselves in a self-help system, it is because their practices made it that way. Changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the system.” (p. 407)

Through more and more interaction among states, certain systems of rules establish. These institutions give states examples on how to behave, how to communicate or how to solve conflicts. The more states act like their own institutions suggest, the more these institutions will influence state behaviour. “[I]ntersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and others must transcend.” (p. 411) If, given the realist theories the credibility that they grasped the present political situation with at least some degree of accuracy, we live today in a self-help world – how could this then be changed? Are we not caught forever, or 'locked in', in constant security dilemmas, forcing us to prepare for violent encounters in the future? How can in such a system change take place?

At this point, probably the most important feature of constructivism enters the field. My essay's question is: “What are the implications of Wendt's claim that anarchy is simply a construct?” The biggest implication is, in my point of view, the return of freedom into state behaviour. States are not bound to mistrust and preparation for war, as structural realism suggests. They can deliberately change their own institutions through changes in behaviour, which are, in the end, changes in structure.

To explain how to willingly change a system of confrontation and mistrust, Wendt gives the example of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. In general, a conscious structural change rests on three necessary steps or 'stages'. First, an existing “consensus about identity commitments” (p. 420) must have collapsed or seriously declined. Second, “old ideas about self and other” (ibid.) must face a comprehensive re-examination, leading to a new perception of both parts. Third, this new perception must be given substance by acting towards the other in according ways. “In order to change the self, then, it is often necessary to change the identities and interests of the others that help sustain those systems of interaction. The vehicle for inducing such change is one's own practice” (p. 421).

Thus, state action does not only take place in a certain environment. It does also alter the very same environment. Through constructivism, the actor's theoretical freedom to act is being advanced. Anarchy is no longer exclusively threatening cooperation and peace. To the contrary, it opens the gate to all sorts of thinkable peace arrangements and leaves the decision to act accordingly in the hands of the states.

Bibliography

• Barnett, Michael (2005): Social Constructivism, in: Baylis/Smith 2005, pp. 251-270.
• Baylis, John and Steve Smith (2005): The Globalization of World Politics. Third Edition, Oxford University Press.
• Burchill, Scott et al.: Theories of International Relations. Third Edition, Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 188-212.
• Cox, Robert (1981): Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory, in: Cox and Sinclair (eds.) (1996): Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press, pp. 85-123.
• Donnelly, Jack (2005): Realism, in: Burchill et al. (2005), pp. 29-54.
• Lamy, Steve L. (2005): Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism, in: Baylis/Smith 2005, pp. 205-224.
• Reus-Smit, Christian (2005): Constructivism, in: Burchill et al. (2005), pp. 188-212.
• Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, in: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring), pp. 391-425.