Markt Design

Titel	Abstract	Bewertung
What Have We Learned from Market Design	Alvin E. Roth, the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration at Harvard Business School, discusses market failures and successes using organ transplants and the New York City and Boston school systems as case studies in the 2007 Rosenthal Memorial Lecture. The Robert Rosenthal Memorial Lecture series was founded in honor of Robert Rosenthal, a longtime member of the College of Arts & Sciences economics faculty. The series brings to campus a prominent economist chosen by economics graduate students, allowing them to interact with the speaker and gain insight into their field. Hosted by the Graduate Economics Association and CAS Economics on April 27, 2007.	3115 views
Alvin Roth - "Rationality and Irrationality in Market Design"	The 20th Anniversary of the Center for the Study of Rationality Alvin Roth -- "Rationality and Irrationality in Market Design"	30 views
Hal R. Varian (Google) - The Economics of Internet Search		13035 views
Dr Philipp Kircher - Modelling in the Labour Market	Dr Philipp Kircher's talk on 'Modelling in The Labour Market'. He introduces the contributions of Diamond, Mortensen and Pisarides on 'the matching function' and the development of work in this field generally. A fantastic insight to how economists and econometricians deal with Unemployment. Highly accessible. Lecture at Simon Langton Grammar School for Boys, for the Faculty of Langton Economists. VISIT - http://www.langtoneconomists.co.uk Dr Philipp Kircher - http://personal.lse.ac.uk/kircher/ London School of Economics, Reader in Economics 2010 -- current University of Oxford and Corpus Christi College, Lecturer in Economics 2009 -- 2010 University of Pennsylvania, Assistant Professor of Economics (partially on leave) 2006 -- 2011 Joint Managing Editor, Review of Economic Studies since 2011	419 views
Market Failure and Market Design	Google Tech Talks October, 11 2007 ABSTRACT An overview of the field of market design Speaker: Al Roth Al Roth is the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, and in the Harvard Business School. His research, teaching, and consulting interests are in game theory, experimental economics, and market design. The best known of the markets he has designed (or, in this case, redesigned) is the National Resident Matching Program, through which approximately twenty thousand doctors a year find their first employment as residents at American hospitals. He has recently been involved in the reorganization of the market for Gastroenterology fellows, which started using a clearinghouse in 2006 for positions beginning in 2007. He helped design the high school matching system used in New York City to match approximately ninety thousand students to high schools each year, starting with students entering high school in the Fall of 2004. He helped redesign the matching system used in Boston Public Schools, adopted for students starting school in September 2006. He is one of the founders and designers of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, for incompatible patient-donor pairs. He is the chair of the American Economic Association's Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, which has designed a number of recent changes in the market for new Ph.D. economists. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Econometric Society, and has been a Guggenheim and Sloan fellow. He received his Ph.D at Stanford University, and came to Harvard from the University of Pittsburgh, where he was the Andrew Mellon Professor of Economics.
Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm	Google Tech Talks June 1, 2007 ABSTRACT The notion of a ``market has undergone a paradigm shift with the Internet -- totally new and highly successful markets have been defined and launched by companies such as Google, Yahoo!, Amazon, MSN and Ebay. These markets are computationally intensive; indeed, this is just the beginning of a much larger revolution in which algorithmic considerations are bound to have an impact. In view of these new realities, the study of market equilibria, an important, though essentially non-algorithmic, theory within Mathematical Economics, needs to be revived and rejuvenated with new models, ideas, and an inherently algorithmic approach.	847 views
Algorithmic Mechanism Design	Google Tech Talks August 15, 2007 ABSTRACT One of the challenges that the Internet raises is the necessity of designing distributed protocols for settings where the participating computers are owned and operated by different owners with different goals. Over the last decade or so there has been much research that aims to address these issues using ideas taken from the micro-economic field of mechanism design. In this talk I will survey the current state of the field: how mechanism design is applied in computational settings, how far can classical ideas go, and what are the challenges for further research. Among the applications discussed will be combinatorial auctions, cost sharing, scheduling,...
On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design - Constantinos Daskalakis	Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory May 26th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Constantinos Daskalakis - On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design Session Chair: Anna Karlin.
Extending General Equilibrium Theory to the Digital Economy - Vijay Vazirani	Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory May 24th, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem Second session: Vijay Vazirani - Extending General Equilibrium Theory to the Digital Economy Session Chair: Amos Fiat	559 views
Cryptography and Solutions for Matching Problems - Micheal O. Rabin	Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory May 23rd, 2011 Hebrew University of Jerusalem First session: Micheal O. Rabin - Cryptography and Solutions for Matching Problems Session Chair: Noam Nisan.	287 views